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Abstract 
We test whether induced mood states have an effect on elicited risk and time preferences in a 
conventional laboratory experiment. We jointly estimate risk and time preferences and find that 
subjects induced into a negative mood exhibit economically significant higher risk aversion than 
those in the control treatment. Those in the positive mood treatment exhibit even higher risk 
aversion. We find no direct effect of mood states on discount rates.  Results also suggest that risk 
preferences are affected by whether a cognitively demanding task precedes a risk preference 
elicitation task or whether subjects were placed in a gender-specific session rather than a mixed-
gender session. 
Keywords: discount rates, risk aversion, lab experiment, mood, affect 
 
Introduction  
 In the beginning of the 20th century, economics was generally devoid of psychological 
concepts by basing economic theory on the principles of rational choice (see Bruni & Sugden, 2007 
for a historical perspective). However, with the advent of “behavioral economics”, there has been 
considerable effort lately in bringing out psychological concepts in economics. Hence, economics 
and psychology no longer stand in complete isolation. Reviews of the fruitfulness of this interaction 
have appeared in core economic journals. For example, Elster (1998) brought out the interesting 
features of “emotions” in the development of economic theory and in explaining human behavior. 
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The seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the collective volume edited by Camerer, 
Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004) have been extremely influential in this respect as well. 
The literature in economics usually confounds emotions and mood in an almost 
indistinguishable way. However, there are stark differences between emotions and moods, as 
described in the psychology literature. Emotions tend to be extremely brief, lasting for a few 
seconds (Izard, 1991; Larsen, 2000) while moods typically last longer (David Watson & Vaidya, 
2003). To quote the example provided in Watson and Vaidya (2003), the full emotion of anger 
might last for only a few seconds while an annoyed or irritable mood may persist for several hours 
or even for a few days. In essence, the concept of mood subsumes all subjective feeling states, not 
simply those experiences that accompany classical, prototypical emotions such as fear and anger 
(David Watson & Vaidya, 2003). Emotions are specific and distinct while mood is more general. 
Therefore, it appears that in order to explore all aspects of affective states on human behavior, it 
would be necessary to go beyond examining the narrow boundaries of emotions and delve into 
studying the much broader concept of mood. 
In this study, we examine the role of mood in joint elicitation of risk and time preferences. 
Studies in the literature that examine the role of mood on risk and time preferences have focused 
only on either risk or time preferences but not both at the same time. The examination of both risk 
and time preferences is important since they are fundamental economic preferences that have been 
found to influence many facets of economic decision-making and human behavior. For example, 
risk and time preferences have been shown to influence self-control problems that could lead to 
negative health outcomes (e.g., Benhabib & Bisin, 2005; Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Fudenberg & 
Levine, 2009). 
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The hypothesis that people tend to make judgments that are mood congruent, dates back to 
Johnson and Tversky (1983). Johnson and Tversky (1983) found that bad mood increased 
subjective probabilities of risk assessments while positive mood produced a comparable decrease in 
subjective probabilities. This hypothesis of mood congruent judgments implies that moods may 
affect preference formation by influencing judgments.  
In psychology, two models of decision making which relate mood states with risk-taking, 
predict the exact opposite things. One of these models is the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) which 
suggests that positive mood increases risk-taking behavior while negative mood reduces the 
tendency to take risks (Forgas, 1995). This is because individuals in an elated mood rely on positive 
cues in making judgments and thus are more likely to think about the positive aspects of risky 
situations than those in a negative mood. The other model is the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis 
(MMH) which asserts that people in elated moods may not want to risk losing the elated state and 
thus render themselves more risk averse (Isen & Patrick, 1983). Hence, according to this model, 
people in negative moods will be willing to take more risk (be less risk averse) in order to obtain 
greater potential gains and consequently a better mood. Many studies in the literature have since 
then taken one side or the other. For example, Isen and Patrick (1983) found that subjects under 
positive affect were betting less on gambles. Those in positive mood have also been found to 
require a higher probability of winning when taking bets (Isen & Geva, 1987).  
Much of the literature on mood and risk aversion appeared only over the last decade. Most 
of these studies can be found not in the economics but in the psychology literature1. For example, 
Hockey et al. (2000) examined the effect of naturally occurring and induced negative moods (in 
particular anxiety, depression and fatigue) on risk in every day (hypothetical) decision making and 
found that fatigue was more strongly linked to increased riskiness. In another study, Hills et al. 
                                                 
1 We only focus on the literature on mood and risk/time preferences for brevity and due to journal page restrictions. 
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(2001) examined the effect of mood states on the amount of time devoted to playing gambling 
games and found that negative moods had an inhibitory effect (which can be interpreted as less risk 
taking) but only for non-regular gamblers. Regular gamblers were completely unaffected. Similarly, 
Yuen and Lee (2003) found that people in induced depressed mood had lower willingness to take 
risk (where risk was defined based on hypothetical choices from everyday life dilemmas) than 
people in neutral and in positive mood while Williams et al. (2003) found that decision makers 
(managers) with high negative affect were more likely to avoid risk (as measured by hypothetical 
choices of actions to varied business scenarios). In a related study, Chou et al. (2007) reconfirmed 
that individuals in a negative mood are less willing to take up more risk (where risk was defined 
similar to Yuen & Lee, 2003).  However, they found an asymmetric age effect, where positive 
mood affects risk taking only for older individuals. More recently, Kugler, Connolly, and Ordóñez 
(2010) found that the impact of prototypical emotions such as fear and anger is contingent upon the 
type of risk.  They found that fearful participants were more risk-averse than angry participants in 
lottery-risk tasks. The fearful participants, however, were less risk-averse than the angry 
participants in tasks where risk was generated by another person’s uncertain behavior. 
Grable and Roszkowski (2008) found that incidental positive mood was positively 
associated with having a higher level of financial risk tolerance (as measured on a financial risk 
tolerance scale). In a laboratory experiment, Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) showed that incidental (not 
induced) good mood has a significant effect on the shape of the probability weighting function for 
women (but not men); that is, women weighed probabilities of gains and losses relatively more 
optimistically than men. In contrast, Walser and Eckel (2010) found no effect of mood on risk 
preferences. 
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 Although there have been a few studies in the economics literature, as discussed above, that 
examined the relation between mood and risk preferences, there have only been two studies that 
explored the link between mood and time preferences. Specifically, McLeish and Oxoby (2007) 
found evidence that inducing subjects with negative mood results in greater impatience (i.e., 
increased discount rates) but only among women.  Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) found that mild 
positive affect significantly reduces time preference. In the marketing literature, Pyone and Isen 
(2011) found that subjects in a positive mood were more forward looking. 
In this study, we revisit the issue of determining the effect of mood states on preferences but 
in contrast to previous studies, we elicit measures of risk and time preferences using a non-
hypothetical conventional lab experiment (according to the terminology of Harrison & List, 2004) 
and jointly estimate the parameters of interest in a structural econometric model. The structural 
model we utilize is particularly tailored and appropriate for studying the effect of psychological 
factors in decision making. Andersen et al. (2010) illustrated the use of these methods in 
applications using well known psychological models. This is an important topic that has not been 
examined in the literature since joint estimation of risk and time preferences could potentially 
provide a different set of results on mood effects than what has been found in previous studies that 
did not jointly elicit or estimate these preferences. For example, Andersen et al. (2008) have shown 
that credible estimation of discount rates rely on the joint estimation of risk and time preferences.  It 
is also important to note that accurate estimation of discount rates can only be achieved if one has 
knowledge about the curvature of the utility function, which can be acquired with the measurement 
of risk preferences.  Thus, the approach taken in Andersen et al. (2008) is to have one experimental 
task to identify the utility function, another task to identify the discount rate conditional on knowing 
the utility function, and jointly estimate the structural model defined over the parameters of the 
utility function and discount rate. 
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In addition, we also utilize the statistical specification and theoretical framework of 
Andersen et al. (2008).  Unlike much of the previously cited literature (with the exception of Fehr-
Duda, et al., 2011; Hills, et al., 2001; Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2010; McLeish & Oxoby, 2007; Walser 
& Eckel, 2010), we use non-hypothetical elicitation procedures and use real monetary incentives for 
recruitment and elicitation of risk and time preferences. We also explore if a cognitively demanding 
task right after mood inducement could affect risk preferences and whether there are gender 
differences in elicited risk and time preferences. 
To further assess the contribution of our study in the literature and be able to compare our 
findings with other studies, we developed a table (see Table A1 in the Appendix) that summarizes 
the relevant literature that relates mood states with risk or time preferences. From the 15 studies we 
identified, only five of them used real financial commitments to elicit risk or time preferences and 
none conducted joint elicitation/estimation of risk and time preferences. Of these five studies that 
used real financial commitments, one study examined incidental moods instead of induced mood 
(Fehr-Duda, et al., 2011) while only a single study (Walser & Eckel, 2010) used validated scales 
from psychology to measure the success of the induction procedure (i.e., mood measurement). Our 
study uses similar procedures used in four out of these five studies (Fehr-Duda, et al., 2011; Ifcher 
& Zarghamee, 2010; McLeish & Oxoby, 2007; Walser & Eckel, 2010). Our sample size is also 
comparable to most of the above cited studies.   
In terms of the results, one of the studies found no effect of mood (Walser & Eckel, 2010) 
on risk, two of the studies found mood effects on time preferences (McLeish & Oxoby, 2007) and 
risk preferences (Fehr-Duda, et al., 2011) but only for women, one study found a significant mood 
effect on risk preferences but only for a sub-sample (i.e, non-gamblers) (Hills, et al., 2001), and one 
study found significant effects on time preferences that hold across all subject groups (Ifcher & 
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Zarghamee, 2010). In contrast to Walser and Eckel (2010) that did not find an effect of mood on 
risk, we find that both positive and negative moods increase risk aversion but this depends on 
whether choices are explained by either Expected Utility theory (EUT) or probability weighting. In 
contrast to Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010), we find no effect of mood on elicited discount rates. 
In addition to the joint elicitation and estimation of risk and time preferences, we also 
extend our design in two directions. First, we inserted a cognitively demanding task (preference 
reversals phase) in half of the sessions. Kim and Kanfer (2009) addressed the inconsistencies 
between AIM and MMH by evaluating what they called “an integrative explanation”. Specifically, 
they showed that if a cognitively demanding task intervenes between mood induction and risk-
taking judgments (defined as choices over dilemmas), the observed trend reverts; i.e., subjects 
exhibited lower levels of risk-taking judgments (offering support for AIM) as opposed to higher 
levels of risk-taking when there is no intervening cognitive task (offering support for MMH). In 
contrast to their study, however, our results suggest that subjects become more risk averse under 
negative mood when no intervention stage is used. We note that Kim and Kanfer’s (2009) study did 
not use real monetary incentives. 
Secondly, due to the widespread evidence of gender differences on choice under risk (e.g., 
Booth & Nolen, 2009a, 2009b; Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), we 
revisit this important issue by employing gender-specific sessions and contrasting these with mixed 
gender sessions. Interestingly, we find evidence that a same-gender environment can alter elicited 
risk preferences (but not discount rates) for females only even though subjects are aware that the 
outcome of their decisions does not depend on decisions made by others. 
In the next sections we describe in detail our experimental procedures, present the 
framework for the analysis and then the results and discussion. 
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Experimental procedures 
The experiment we designed was part of a larger project on choice under risk that also 
involved a lottery choice task and a lottery auction task aimed at identifying preference reversals. In 
this paper, we used a preference reversal task as a cognitive intervening stage before risk elicitation 
to check if this intervening stage would make a difference in the measurement of risk preferences 
under different mood states, as has been proposed in the literature (Kim & Kanfer, 2009). 
Following Andersen et al. (2008), the time preference task was placed at the very end of each 
session since it involved winning a considerable amount of money and we did not want to risk 
contaminating the previous tasks with income effects. Andersen et al. (2010) found in one of their 
treatments that there are no statistically or economically significant order effects in the risk and time 
preference tasks. Order effects are more likely to appear in situations where a similar task is 
repeated twice (or more) as in Harrison et al. (2005). Since our risk and preference reversal tasks 
both involve lotteries and might be considered similar, we presented them to subjects in alternating 
order between sessions.  
As discussed earlier, due to the widespread evidence of gender differences on choice under 
risk (e.g., Booth & Nolen, 2009a, 2009b; Gneezy, et al., 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), we 
also tested whether risk and time preferences might be affected when we alter the environment of 
the session in terms of gender. Therefore, we conducted additional sessions with males only and 
females only. 
To minimize the number of sessions that we would need to run the full design, we decided 
to induce different mood states to subjects in the same session. Given that our computer lab is 
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equipped with private booths and no communication between subjects was aloud, we were certain 
that no mood contagion took place. Our mood inducement technique is described in detail below. 
Our full design involved six treatments in six sessions2. In the first two treatments we 
induced half of the subjects with positive mood and half of the subjects with negative mood. The 
only difference between the first two treatments was that the order of the preference reversals and 
risk preferences task were alternated. In treatments 3 and 4 (our control treatments), mood was only 
measured and not induced. The order of the preference reversals and the risk preferences task was 
also alternated in these treatments. Treatments 5 and 6 were similar to treatment 1 except that 
subjects in these treatments were all females and males, respectively. Table I shows the 
experimental design. We only used one proctor or monitor (i.e., one of the authors) for all sessions. 
To isolate the role of mood and order of the tasks on risk and time preferences we first analyzed 
treatments 1 to 4 together and then analyzed treatments 1, 5, and 6 together to explore gender 
differences in our data.  
 
Description of the experiment 
The conventional lab experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007).3 Subjects consisted of undergraduate students at the AAA University (removed for peer 
review; to be adjusted upon publication). During the recruitment, the nature of the experiment and 
the expected earnings were not mentioned. However, subjects were told that they will be given the 
                                                 
2 In our very first session a couple of things went wrong which prompted us to rerun this session with a completely 
different set of subjects. First, one of the subjects could not keep himself quiet during the experiment although we 
pointed out the necessity of no communication. Improper behavior resulted in early termination of his participation in 
the session. In addition, a server failure resulted in having subjects wait for more than 10 minutes doing nothing. Since 
the necessary control was lost and given the sensitivity of our design to contaminating mood behavior, we decided to 
dismiss all data from this session. Therefore, in total we ran seven sessions, the seventh being a re-run of treatment one. 
We dismissed data from session 1 from all further analysis. 
3 z-Tree is a software package designed to facilitate computer-based economic experiments. It has been used in 
numerous experiments as evident by the more than 2300 citations that the paper documenting the software has collected 
in Google scholar.  
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chance to make more money during the experiment. Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to 
generate samples that are less risk averse than would otherwise have been observed (Harrison, Lau, 
& Rutström, 2009). 
Each subject participated in only one of the treatments exhibited in Table I. The size of the 
groups varied from 15 to 18 subjects per treatment. Each treatment lasted a little more than an hour. 
In total, 101 subjects participated in our experiments, which were conducted in March 2010. This 
number does not include 15 subjects from session 1 that were dismissed from any further data 
analysis. We considered these data contaminated as noted in footnote 2. 
Each session consisted of different phases: the mood induction phase, the lottery choice 
phase, the lottery auction phase, the mood measurement phase, the risk preferences phase, the time 
preferences phase and the post-auction phase4. The lottery auction and choice phases are not part of 
the research agenda of this paper and will not be given further consideration. Subjects were given 
prior instructions on the overall layout of the session and were also reminded about the procedures 
at the beginning of each phase. Experimental instructions are available at the anonymous website 
https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/. 
 
The mood induction phase 
Mood induction procedures have been widely used by psychologists and have also been 
adopted by economists (e.g., Capra, 2004; Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, & Rustichini, 2006). Capra et al. 
(2010) give a brief summary of the different methods used in the psychology literature. In this study 
we used experience of success/failure as our mood induction procedure, similar to what was used in 
                                                 
4 We also measured the rate of preference reversals using lottery choice tasks and lottery auction tasks but since these 
phases are not part of this paper’s research focus, we are not giving a detailed discussion. Prior to the auction phase and 
mood induction there was also significant training with the auction mechanism which included hypothetical as well as 
real auctions. These phases of the experiment are discussed in .....(REMOVED FOR PEER REVIEW). 
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many other studies (Barone, Miniard, & Romeo, 2000; Capra, 2004; Capra, et al., 2010; Curtis, 
2006; Hill & Ward, 1989; Swinyard, 1993, 2003). Specifically, subjects in the mood induction 
treatments were given a MENSA test that had to be completed within 6 minutes. Half of the 
subjects received a 16-question hard MENSA test and half of the subjects received an easy 
MENSA test (the tests are available at https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/).   
The questions were first pretested in an online survey with a convenience sample using 
snowballing methods. Subjects were randomly exposed to one of the two versions. After taking the 
MENSA test online, we then measured subjects’ moods (see next subsection). In the online hard 
version, the pretest subjects answered on average 4.5 questions correctly while in the online easy 
version, the pretest subjects answered 12.9 questions. Their scores were displayed right after the 
expiration of the time required to complete the test, along with a phrase based on previous research 
stating that a person between 18-55 years old normally answers about 10 questions correctly, that 
95% of the people answer at least 6 questions correctly and that only 5% answer more than 12 
questions correctly. For the laboratory sample this phrase corresponds to the performance of 
subjects in our online survey which also received an average of 10 correct questions and have the 
same age distribution when averaging across both versions of the test. The same phrase was used in 
the online test and since it was effective in inducing mood (see next paragraph) and generally 
corresponded with the actual distribution of correct answers, we decided to use the same phrase for 
the lab auction experiment. 
Given subjects’ scores in the two versions, this feedback immediately placed the average 
subject in the hard version to the low 5% of the population while the average subject in the easy 
version was placed at the top 5%. This way subjects in the hard version experienced failure and 
subjects in the easy version experienced success. In a sample of 49 subjects in the online pretest, the 
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two versions of the test were adequate in inducing different levels of positive affect (the null of 
equal scores on the positive affect scale was highly rejected on a t-test with a p-value of 0.02). 
The procedure we discussed above is not new, has been validated, and has been used in 
several other studies (e.g., Barone, et al., 2000; Swinyard, 1993, 2003). To successfully complete 
the inducement phase in the lab, subjects in the lab were only told that this phrase corresponds to 
the results obtained from another subject pool (i.e., information that corresponded to the 
performance of subjects from our online test)5. Subjects that answered the hard version of the test, 
scored significantly lower in the positive affect scale (discussed in the next paragraph). There was 
no significant difference between subjects with respect to the negative affect scale. 
 
The mood measurement phase 
To find ways to measure mood, we turned to the psychology literature for guidance. Watson 
and Vaidya  (2003) provided a comprehensive overview of the dimensionality of the mood 
construct as well as on ways to measure its dimensions. Mood is usually depicted as a circular 
scheme with four bipolar dimensions that are spaced 45 degrees apart. The positive affect and 
negative affect dimensions are considered the most important measures of the higher order 
dimension.  
The PANAS scale (Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; which was later subsumed 
into the PANAS-X)  (D. Watson, 1988) emerged as the standard measure of these constructs and 
has been widely used in the literature (Bono & Ilies, 2006; de Ruyter & Bloemer, 1998; Pelled & 
Xin, 1999; Pocheptsova & Novemsky, 2010; Pugh, 2001). The terms comprising the PANAS-X 
                                                 
5 Another method for inducing moods is the use of film clips.  However, an important limitation of the use of films is 
that there are no widely accepted sets of mood eliciting film stimuli, not to mention the challenge of finding film stimuli 
for culturally different or non-English speaking subjects.  
 
13 
 
Positive Affect scale are active, alert, attentive, determined, enthusiastic, excited, inspired, 
interested, proud, and strong; the items included in the Negative Affect scale are afraid, ashamed, 
distressed, guilty, hostile, irritable, jittery, nervous, scared, and upset. Subjects rated the extent to 
which they experienced each term right after inducement on a 5-point scale (1 = very slightly or not 
at all, 5 = extremely). In the lab the order of appearance of these terms was randomized. The scale 
has been thoroughly tested for reliability and validity (see David Watson & Vaidya, 2003). 
 
The risk preferences phase  
To elicit risk preferences we used the multiple price list (MPL) design devised by Holt and 
Laury (2002). In this design each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries, A or B as 
illustrated in Table II. In the first row the subject is asked to make a choice between lottery A, 
which offers a 10% chance of receiving €2 and a 90% chance of receiving €1.6, and lottery B, 
which offers a 10% chance of receiving €3.85 and a 90% chance of receiving €0.1. The expected 
value of lottery A is €1.64 while for lottery B it is €0.475, which results in a difference of €1.17 
between the expected values of the lotteries. Proceeding down the table to the last row, the expected 
values of the lotteries increase but increases much faster for lottery B.  
For each row, a subject chooses A or B and one row is then randomly selected as binding 
for the payout.6 Due to financial constraints, subjects were informed that after the session, one 
subject will be randomly chosen as the winner. The last row is a simple test of whether subjects 
understood the instructions correctly. A risk neutral subject should switch from lottery A to lottery 
B at the 5th row. In our experiments subjects undertook three risk aversion tasks: they made choices 
from Table II (the 1x table), a table where payoffs were scaled up by 10 (the 10x table) and a table 
                                                 
6 In every step that involved random drawings by the computer, we reassured subjects that the drawing was fair and that 
extra care was taken by the programmer to make sure that this is the case. 
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similar to Table II but without the last three rows (the 1x-framed table). The order of appearance of 
the tables for each subject was completely randomized to avoid order effects (Harrison, et al., 
2005). The 10x table served as an elicitation vehicle of risk when larger payoffs are involved while 
the 1x-framed table was used as an alternate format since subjects could be drawn in the middle of 
the ordered table irrespective of their true value (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2007). One 
of these tables was chosen at the end as binding for the payout. Thus, to infer risk preferences, 
subjects were asked to provide 27 binary choices from the risk preference task.  
 
The time preferences phase  
The experimental design for measuring discount rates is based on the experiments of Coller 
and Williams (1999), Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) and Andersen et al. (2008). Subjects are 
confronted with payoff  tables similar to Table III and made choices from three tables with different 
time horizons: the 3-month time horizon table (Table III), the 6-month time horizon table (payment 
option B pays in 7 months) and the 12-month time horizon table (payment option B pays in 13 
months). At the end of the experiment only one table and one row were randomly drawn as binding. 
Financial constraints precluded us from paying every single subject in each session and hence only 
one subject was randomly drawn as the winner. 
In Table III, option A offers 300 € in 1 month and option B offers 300 € +x € in 4 months, 
where x ranged from annual interests rates of 5% to 50% on the principal of 300 €, compounded 
semi-annualy to be consistent with national banking practices on savings accounts. The table also 
includes the annual effective interest rates to facilitate comparisons between lab and field 
investments (Andersen, et al., 2008). The argument for including such seemingly unimportant rates 
is that in many countries, including the country where we conducted the experiment, such rates 
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need to be provided as part of a regulatory requirement for most consumer loans. Another reason is 
that we did not want our subjects to exert additional effort in calculating these rates given the other 
tasks demanded of them already. Andersen et al. (2011) experimentally varied the provision of such 
rates and found no effect on elicited discount rates. 
The tasks provided two future income options instead of one instant and one future option. 
This front-end delay on the early payment has two advantages: it holds the transaction costs of 
future options constant (see Coller & Williams, 1999 for a discussion) and it avoids the passion for 
the present that decision makers exhibit when offered monetary amounts today or in the future. It 
also allows us to equalize the credibility of future payments. Payments were promised by a 
permanent faculty member of the university by means of a notarized post-dated check. A national 
bank served as the third party guarantor as well. Thus subjects provided 30 binary choices for the 
time preference task that are used to infer time preferences. 
 
The post-experiment phase 
Subjects provided information about their age, household size and income. Experimental 
instructions are available at https://sites.google.com/site/risktimemood/. 
 
Identification of risk and time preferences 
 The identification of risk and time preferences closely follows the framework of Andersen et al. 
(2008), so we will only repeat the basic information here. Andersen et al. (2008) discussed in detail 
how to put parametric structure on the identification of risk and time preferences, the theoretical 
issues involved, and the statistical specification. 
 Let the utility function be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification: 
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  1
1
rMU M
r

           (1) 
for r≠1, where r is the CRRA coefficient. In (1), r=0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r>0 denotes risk 
aversion behavior and r<0 denotes risk loving behavior. 
 In addition, if we assume that Expected Utility Theory (EUT) holds for the choices over risky 
alternatives and that discounting is exponential then the subject is indifferent between two income 
options tM  and tM  if and only if: 
     
1
1t t
U M U M           (2) 
where  tU M  is the utility of monetary outcome tM  for delivery at time t ,  is the discount rate, 
  is the horizon for delivery of the later monetary outcome at time t  , and the utility function is 
separable and stationary over time7.  is the discount rate that equalizes the present value of the two 
monetary outcomes in the indifference condition (2). 
The binary choices of the subjects in the risk preference tasks can be explained by different 
CRRA coefficients. For example, a subject that made four safe choices (i.e., choosing option A) and 
then switched to option B would have revealed a CRRA interval of -0.15 to 0.40. The intervals are 
reported in Table II. Similarly, the binary choices in the time preference tasks can be explained by 
different discount rates. A subject that chose 300 € in 1 month would have revealed a discount rate 
                                                 
7 The assumption of having an additively separable utility function implicitly imposes intertemporal risk neutrality. For 
a relaxation of this assumption, see Andersen et al. (2011). Andersen et al. (2011) find that relaxing the assumption of 
intertemporal risk neutrality leads to comparable results with those in Andersen et al. (2008) that assumed intertemporal 
risk neutrality. In addition, since our primary purpose is to make comparisons between treatments, imposing or relaxing 
the assumption of intertemporal risk neutrality would make little difference in between treatment comparisons. 
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higher than  / 300 100%x  ; otherwise she would have revealed an annual discount rate of 
 / 300 100%x   or less8. 
Andersen et al. (2008) explicitly write the likelihood function for the choices that subjects 
make in these tasks and jointly estimate the risk parameter r and the discount rate  . The 
contribution to the overall likelihood from the risk aversion responses can be written for each 
lottery i as: 
    
1,2
i j j
j
EU p M U M

   (3) 
where  jp M  are the probabilities for each outcome jM  that are induced by the experimenter (i.e., 
columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 in Table II). To specify the likelihoods conditional on the model, a stochastic 
specification from Holt and Laury (2002) is used. The expected utility (EU) for each lottery pair is 
calculated for candidate estimate of r and the ratio: 
1
1 1
B
A B
EUEU
EU EU

     (4) 
is then calculated where AEU  and BEU  refer to options A and B respectively, and   is a structural 
noise parameter. The index in (4) is linked to observed choices by specifying that the option B is 
chosen when 12EU  . 
The conditional log-likelihood can then be written as: 
        ln , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1RA i i
i
L r y EU y EU y       X  (5) 
                                                 
8 The fact that the whole experiment was computerized allowed us to impose monotonic preferences (i.e., subjects could 
only switch once to option B and could not go back and forth). This does not mean, however, that subjects only had to 
indicate their switching point. Subjects had to specifically go through all options and indicate if they choose option A or 
option B. 
We did not allow for indifference between A and B choices either. Subjects had to clearly state whether they preferred 
option A or B. 
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where  1 1iy    denotes the choice of the option B (A) lottery in the risk preference task i. 
The conditional log-likelihood for the time preference task can be written in a similar 
manner if we write the discounted utility of each option as: 
1
1
r
A
A
MPV
r

    and    
11
11
r
B
B
MPV
r

     (6) 
and the index of the present values as: 
1
1 1
B
A B
PVPV
PV PV

           (7) 
where   is a noise parameter for the discount rate tasks. The log-likelihood will then be: 
        ln , , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1DR i i
i
L r y PV y PV y        X  (8) 
and the joint likelihood will be: 
      ln , , , ; , ln , ; , ln , , ; ,RA DRL r y L r y L r y      X X X .  (9) 
Each parameter in equation (9) can be allowed to be a linear function of treatment effects. 
Equation (9) can be maximized using standard numerical methods. We used the routines made 
available as a supplemental material in Andersen et al. (2008) with appropriate modifications. For a 
more thorough and pedagogical treatise on maximum likelihood estimation of utility functions, see 
Appendix F in Harrison and Rutstrom (2008) or Harrison (2008). The statistical specification also 
takes into account the multiple responses given by the same subject and allows for correlation 
between responses. Standard errors were computed using the delta method. 
 
Estimation and results 
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Each subject in our experiment responded to 57 binary tasks (27 for the risk preference tasks 
and 30 for the time preference tasks). Data from subjects who chose lottery A over the last row of 
Table II were dismissed since this is a sign that they failed to comprehend the task. Therefore, 15 
subjects were further dropped which resulted in a sample size of 86 subjects, with 2322 risk 
aversion choices and 2580 discount rate choices.  As mentioned previously, since this paper has a 
twofold goal, we first analyze treatments 1 to 4 together and then examine treatments 1, 5 and 6. 
 
Was the mood induction successful? 
 Figure I displays the kernel density estimates of the affect scores for positive and negative 
affect, respectively. The vertical lines depict mean estimates of the scores per treatment.  Remember 
that a hard MENSA test aims to induce a negative mood to subjects and an easy MENSA test aims 
to induce a positive mood state through experience of failure and success, respectively. We are 
certain that our subjects experienced success or failure given that those exposed to the easy 
MENSA test in the lab answered on average 12.9 questions correctly (out of 16) while those 
exposed to the hard MENSA test answered only about 6 questions correctly.  
 It is obvious from panel A that the density function of positive affect for those exposed to the 
hard MENSA test is slightly shifted to the left implying lower scores for those exposed to the hard 
test. The density function of those exposed to the easy test has a slightly larger peak but is 
otherwise very close to the density function of the control group. One could tell a similar story 
based on the means (vertical lines) of the positive affect scores across treatments. 
 Panel B shows that both densities associated with the negative affect scores of those exposed to 
the easy and hard test are shifted right with respect to the control group. The density function of 
those exposed to the hard test is slightly more to the right but is practically indistinguishable from 
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the density function of those exposed to an easy test. Comparing the means just reconfirms the 
above. 
These results also hold up in a regression context. We run separate regressions for the positive 
affect and negative affect scales which are depicted in Table IV. The list of covariates includes 
dummies for those exposed to the easy and hard MENSA tests (the control treatments, where mood 
was not induced, serve as the base category). We used demographic variables as additional control 
variables. Variable description is exhibited in Table V. 
 Results are in agreement with Figure I. Subjects that were exposed to a hard test scored 
significantly lower (by almost 4 points) in the positive affect scale compared to subjects in a control 
group and those who took the easy test. No statistically significant differences are observed 
between those answering an easy test and those in the control group and the magnitude of the 
difference in the scores is negligible. Hence, our mood induction procedure was able to induce 
lower levels of positive affect to those that took the hard test. 
 On the other hand, both the easy and hard tests induced higher negative affect with respect to 
the control group by as much as 5 points, which is also evident in Figure I where both density 
functions are shifted to the right. The Hard coefficient is larger than the Easy coefficient by one 
point (i.e., those exposed to a hard test had on average higher levels of negative affect) although 
their difference is not statistically significant. So why did both procedures induce higher negative 
affect? One explanation could be that the quiz-type procedure resembles exams that associate 
negatively with students’ mood (e.g., test anxiety). It is also important to remember that positive 
affect and negative affect are two dimensions of mood that can co-exist. The overall conclusion is 
that subjects that took the hard test had lower positive affect than subjects that took the easy test 
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and there was no statistically significant difference in their negative affect level. They also 
exhibited less positive affect and higher negative affect than the control group.  
 
Risk aversion and discount rates under induced mood states 
We first analyze data from treatments 1 to 4 to examine whether mood states can affect risk 
and time preference elicitation. Also, since we alternated the order of the preference reversal task 
and the risk preference task after mood inducement, we are able to test the AIM vs. MMH issue; 
that is, examine the effect of an intervening cognitively demanding task before risk elicitation. Kim 
and Kanfer (2009) found that this procedure makes a significant difference when evaluating risk-
taking judgments. 
Table VI exhibits the maximum likelihood estimates of risk and time preferences. We 
allowed the   and r  parameters of equation (9) to be linear functions of treatment effects. We 
model r  as a linear function of the treatment variables (Positive mood, Negative mood, Task order) 
as well as their interactions (Positive x Order, Negative x Order) in order to capture the differential 
effect of the order of the tasks and mood induction as predicted by AIM and MMH. The   
parameter is modeled as a linear function of the treatment variables alone (no interaction effects). 
One could in principle allow several variables to enter the linear specification of   and r  but this 
comes at the cost of convergence, at least with our data. Given our random assignment to treatments 
we can safely assume that our effects are causal. There are also no significant differences in the 
socio-demographic profile of our subjects between the treatments. We used chi-square and 
Fischer’s exact tests to check the variables depicted in Table V (t-tests were used for the continuous 
variables like age and household size). None of the differences was statistically significant. 
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Panel A presents the maximum likelihood estimates allowing for risk aversion (joint 
estimation of risk and time preferences) and assuming an exponential discounting specification.  
Results in panel A show three things. The first is that mood does not significantly affect time 
preferences directly. While signs of the coefficients are in the expected direction, i.e., subjects in 
positive mood exhibit higher discount rates while subjects in negative mood exhibit lower discount 
rates, these are not statistically significant given the dispersions.  
Second, with respect to risk preferences, positive mood has no statistically significant effect 
on relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficient while negative mood increases risk aversion (by 0.24) 
but only when there is no intervening task between mood induction and risk preference elicitation. 
This also means that mood affects time preferences indirectly by altering risk aversion. When we 
insert an intervening task (i.e., a cognitively demanding task), the effect is very small and 
statistically insignificant. This finding supports the AIM model (versus the Mood Maintenance 
Hypothesis) but not the integrative explanation of Kim and Kanfer’s (2009) which predicts that 
subjects in negative mood should be less risk averse when there is no intervening stage between 
mood induction and risk preference elicitation. Our results therefore question the intervening stage 
explanation offered by Kim and Kanfer (2009) which was based on the use of hypothetical 
elicitation of risk preferences. 
Finally with respect to the order of the tasks, for subjects that we intervened with a 
cognitively demanding task, risk aversion increased when they were induced with positive mood or 
not induced at all (control treatment). The RRA coefficient was not affected when induced with 
negative mood. A t-test indicates that the effect of the order of the tasks was not significantly 
different between positive mood and control treatment. 
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Robustness checks 
Basic insights gained over the previous section about the effect of mood on risk and time 
preferences clearly hinge upon certain assumptions about functional forms. In this section we 
examine how robust our results are when we deviate from these assumptions. We first consider an 
alternative discounting function assumed by hyperbolic discounting models9, then introduce a Rank 
Dependent Utility (RDU) for risk and an expo-power utility function. 
Hyperbolic discounting 
When considering a hyperbolic discounting function, one would need to replace (6) with: 
1
1
r
A
A
MPV
r

    and    
11
1 1
r
B
B
MPV
k r

     (10) 
for 0k  . Panel B in Table VI shows estimates when considering this alternative discounting 
function. Not only do we get qualitatively similar results as compared to the exponential 
discounting model but many estimates also do not significantly change in magnitude. Therefore, it 
appears that the issue of whether to use an exponential or hyperbolic discounting specification is 
not important, at least with our data.  
Rank Dependent Utility and expo-power utility function 
Up to now we have only assumed Expected Utility for risk. Since the Allais paradoxes (Allais, 
1953) for EUT and the Nobel-prize winning work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we know that 
EUT often fails and that one must account for probability weighting especially when using smaller 
scale payoffs. Rank Dependent Utility (Quiggin, 1982) extends the EUT model by allowing for 
decision weights on lottery outcomes. To calculate decision weights under RDU one replaces the 
expected utility defined by (3) with: 
                                                 
9 As discussed in Andersen et al. (2008), the use of the quasi-hyperbolic specification is not possible due to the 
existence of a front end delay in our tasks. 
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        
1,2 1,2
i j j j j
j j
EU w p M U M w U M
 
        (11) 
where      2 2 1 1 11w w p p w p w p      and  1 1w w p , with outcomes ranked from worst 
(outcome 2) to best (outcome 1) and  w   is some weighting function. We adopt the weighting 
function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which has been extensively used in the 
literature and assumes weights of the form: 
    11w p p p p             (12) 
 In (12), when 1  , it implies that  w p p  and this serves as a formal test of the 
hypothesis of no probability weighting10.  
In addition, one may argue that the risk aversion tasks are done over a different prize domain 
than the discount rate tasks. This would cause no problem for the assumption of the CRRA 
function, given that risk aversion is then constant. It would pose a problem however, if other forms 
are assumed. To allow for the possibility that the relative risk aversion is not constant, we estimate 
a more flexible functional form by adapting the hybrid expo-power function of Saha (1993). The 
expo-power function can be defined as     11 exp ru M aM a   , where M is income and a  and 
r  are parameters to be estimated. Relative risk aversion (RRA) is then   11 rr a r M   , so RRA 
varies with income if 0a  . This function nests CRRA (as 0a  ). 
Table VII exhibits the estimates when we assume RDU for risk and an expo-power function. 
Since exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting produce similar results, as shown above, 
we only estimate exponential discounting models. We allow r , a  and    to be linear functions of 
the treatment variables (Positive mood, Negative mood, Task order) as well as their interactions 
                                                 
10 It should be obvious that    1 2 1 1w p p w   . 
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(Positive x Order, Negative x Order). The discount factor   is modeled as a linear function of the 
treatment variables alone. 
We test linear combinations of the coefficients of the treatment variables. A Wald test of the 
hypothesis that the parameter   is equal to one, highly rejects the null in the majority of cases, 
which justifies the use of RDU. A Wald test of the hypothesis that 0a   rejects the null of only 
one case but this is enough to justify the use of the expo-power function. A joint significance test of 
( 0a  , 1  ) highly rejects the null of all cases. 
There are two notable differences with the results of the previous section that are worth 
discussing and require careful interpretation. The first one is with respect to the effect of the 
treatment variables on risk preferences. Results show that negative mood has no (statistically 
significant) effect on risk aversion. However, for the case where there is no intervention stage, the 
result is marginally not significant but the magnitude of the coefficient shows an economically 
significant effect. We also do not find a statistically significant effect for subjects induced with 
positive mood. When a cognitively demand stage was intervened, the statistical significance of the 
effect increased although still marginally not significant.  The size of the coefficient however 
suggests an economically significant effect. Both results contrast with the results obtained under 
EUT specification with CRRA function.  
In addition, mood has no direct effect on elicited time preferences. This is in accordance with 
previous results from the EUT specification. Thus, mood only indirectly affects time preferences.  
 
Risk aversion, discount rates and mood: Are there gender differences? 
 To test for gender differences on choice under risk, we ran gender-specific sessions represented 
by Treatments 5 and 6 in Table I. We did not alternate the order of the tasks as done in Treatments 
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1 to 4, since we have tested and demonstrated this effect in the previous section. To explore for 
gender differences, we compared Treatments 1, 5 and 6 and used the data from these treatments 
only. Table VII shows the maximum likelihood estimates from these treatments using RDU for risk 
and an expo-power function. We allow r , a  and   to be linear functions of treatment effects 
(namely the Positive, FemTreat and MaleTreat variables), gender, and the interaction between 
gender and positive mood inducement dummy. The discount factor   was modeled without an 
interaction term.  
We test linear combinations of coefficients of the treatment variables. A Wald test of the 
hypothesis that the parameter   is equal to one, highly rejects the null in all cases. This justifies the 
use of RDU. A Wald test of the hypothesis that 0a   rejects the null in all cases, which justifies 
the use of the expo-power function. A joint significance test ( 0a  , 1  ) highly rejects the null 
in all cases. 
 The first thing we note from Table VIII is that none of the treatment variables has a direct 
statistically significant effect on time preferences while several variables affect time preferences 
indirectly through risk aversion. Positive mood has a gender specific effect for females. 
Specifically, females (but not males) induced in positive mood exhibit lower risk aversion levels 
(by 0.49 points) as compared to negative mood inducement. In addition, the level of risk aversion 
does not statistically significantly differ between males and females when induced with positive 
mood. Males also exhibit lower risk aversion (by 0.72 points) when induced in negative mood. 
 Furthermore, the peer environment had an effect on risk preference elicitation. It appears that 
subjects behave differently when they are in mixed gender sessions. Females reduce their level of 
risk aversion by 0.41 when placed in all female sessions. In contrast, for males there is no 
significant difference in the results in mixed or gender specific sessions. These differences exist 
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despite the fact that subjects made decisions that they knew did not depend on other subjects in the 
session.  
 In addition, there is no effect of any of the treatment variables on  . However, the   
parameter is larger for males in gender specific sessions (as compared to mixed sessions) and for 
females in the mixed gender sessions (as compared to males). 
  
Conclusions 
Our objective in this study is to assess the effect of mood states on risk and time 
preferences. Our paper differs from previous studies in two important ways. First, we 
simultaneously elicited measures of risk and time preferences and jointly estimated the parameters 
of interest using structural econometric methods. Credible estimates of risk and time preferences 
have been found to rely on the joint estimation of risk and time preferences (Andersen et al. 2008). 
Yet, none of the previous studies jointly elicited these preferences when examining mood effects. 
Second, a vast majority of the studies that examined the effect of mood states on risk or time 
preferences was conducted in hypothetical contexts. We conducted our risk and time elicitation 
tasks non-hypothetically. Our results generally suggest that negative and positive mood states can 
(economically) significantly affect time preferences indirectly (the indirect effect comes from the 
effect on risk aversion coefficients). Although results are not statistically significant at the 10% 
level, we note that these are just marginally not significant. Negative mood increases risk aversion 
(but only when we do not intervene a cognitively demanding task) while positive mood increases 
risk aversion much more (but only when a cognitively demanding task is intervened). Their 
difference is significant as well. We find no direct effect of mood states on time preferences. Thus, 
we cannot reconfirm the result of Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) which suggests that mild positive 
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affect directly significantly increases the present value of a future payment. Our finding seemed 
surprising at first, given the many similarities in the experimental procedures followed (e.g., paid 
for recruitment, real elicitation context, student sample etc.) in their study and ours. However, 
Ifcher and Zarghamee (2010) did not consider the simultaneous determination of risk and time 
preferences. Thus, in contrast to our work, they implicitly assumed risk neutrality in eliciting time 
preferences and did not employ a more flexible model. They identify a direct effect on time 
preferences but we find that this effect comes through risk aversion. 
Considering the robust finding in the literature of the general effect of risk and time 
preferences on human behavior and health outcomes (e.g., Benhabib & Bisin, 2005; Bernheim & 
Rangel, 2004; Fudenberg & Levine, 2009), the issue examined in our study has significant 
implications for assessment of the potential mechanisms through which risk and time preferences 
affect behavior and health outcomes. Our study supports the argument offered in Ifcher and 
Zarghamee (2010) that affect should be neutralized before elicitation of time preferences (note that 
although we only find an indirect effect, this can be significant overall) and that uncontrolled affect 
may be partially responsible for the wide range of time preference values estimated in past time 
preference studies. It is possible that mood effects could be responsible for the divergence of 
findings in risk preference elicitation studies as well. This issue is important in psychology and 
economics considering the large literature devoted to estimating and analyzing risk preferences. 
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Table I. Experimental design 
Treatments Mood inducement Subject pool Order of Tasks 
1 Yes, Positive-Negative Mixed Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
2 Yes, Positive-Negative Mixed Risk Preferences – Preference Reversals 
3 No Mixed Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
4 No Mixed Risk Preferences – Preference Reversals 
5 Yes, Positive-Negative Females Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
6 Yes, Positive-Negative Males Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
 
Table II. Sample payoff matrix in the risk aversion experiments 
Lottery A 
 
Lottery B 
EVA (€) EVB (€) Difference (€) 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to 
Lottery B p € p € p € p € 
0.1 2 0.9 1.6  0.1 3.85 0.9 0.1 1.640 0.475 1.17 -∞ -1.71 
0.2 2 0.8 1.6  0.2 3.85 0.8 0.1 1.680 0.850 0.83 -1.71 -0.95 
0.3 2 0.7 1.6  0.3 3.85 0.7 0.1 1.720 1.225 0.50 -0.95 -0.49 
0.4 2 0.6 1.6  0.4 3.85 0.6 0.1 1.760 1.600 0.16 -0.49 -0.15 
0.5 2 0.5 1.6  0.5 3.85 0.5 0.1 1.800 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14 
0.6 2 0.4 1.6  0.6 3.85 0.4 0.1 1.840 2.350 -0.51 0.14 0.41 
0.7 2 0.3 1.6  0.7 3.85 0.3 0.1 1.880 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68 
0.8 2 0.2 1.6  0.8 3.85 0.2 0.1 1.920 3.100 -1.18 0.68 0.97 
0.9 2 0.1 1.6  0.9 3.85 0.1 0.1 1.960 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37 
1 2 0 1.6  1 3.85 0 0.1 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞ 
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not shown 
to subjects. 
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Table III. Payoff table for 3 month horizon in discount rate experiments 
Payoff alternative 
Payment option A 
in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 1 month)
Payment option B 
in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 4 months)
Annual interest 
rate in % 
Annual 
effective 
interest rate in 
% 
1 300 304 5 3.4 
2 300 308 10 6.8 
3 300 311 15 10.1 
4 300 315 20 13.5 
5 300 319 25 16.9 
6 300 323 30 20.3 
7 300 326 35 23.6 
8 300 330 40 27.0 
9 300 334 45 30.4 
10 300 338 50 33.8 
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Table IV. Regression results for positive and negative affect 
Positive affect Negative affect 
Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error
Constant 43.577** 17.847 45.698*** 13.765 
Easy 0.549 1.711 3.917*** 1.319 
Hard -3.776** 1.703 5.013*** 1.313 
Age -0.078 0.944 -1.796** 0.728 
Gender 0.566 1.394 2.277** 1.075 
Hsize -0.187 0.671 -0.325 0.518 
Educ2 -1.287 2.485 0.908 1.916 
Educ3 -3.092 2.756 3.779* 2.126 
Educ4 -2.239 3.858 5.124* 2.976 
Educ5 -1.917 4.926 7.057* 3.799 
Income2 -4.826 2.990 1.320 2.306 
Income3 -5.018 3.187 3.394 2.458 
Income4 -0.334 3.164 0.387 2.440 
R-squared 0.187 0.254 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.076 0.153 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
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Table V. Variable description 
Variable Variable description Mean SD 
Age Subject's Age 20.523 1.636
Gender Dummy, 1=male 0.442 0.500
Hsize Household size 4.279 1.059
Educ1* Dummy, 1st year student 0.221 0.417
Educ2 Dummy, 2nd year student 0.128 0.336
Educ3 Dummy, 3rd year student 0.349 0.479
Educ4 Dummy, 4th year student 0.186 0.391
Educ5 Dummy, 5th year student 0.116 0.322
Income1* 
Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is good, very 
good or above average 0.070 0.256
Income2 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is average 0.512 0.503
Income3 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is below average 0.221 0.417
Income4 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is bad or very bad 0.198 0.401
Positive 
mood 
(Hard) 
Dummy, Subject is induced into positive mood (exposed to 
hard MENSA test) 0.384 0.489
Negative 
mood 
(Easy) 
Dummy, Subject is induced into negative mood (exposed 
to easy MENSA test) 0.349 0.479
Control* Dummy, Subject's mood is not induced 0.267 0.445
Task 
order Dummy, Preference reversal task is conducted first 0.686 0.467
FemTreat Dummy, only females in the session 0.186 0.391
MaleTreat Dummy, only males in the session 0.198 0.401
Mixed* Dummy, mixed gender sessions 0.616 0.489
* Removed for estimation purposes. 
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Table VI. Estimates of risk and time preferences  
CRRA coefficient (r) 
 Individual discount rate (  for 
exponential, k  for hyperbolic) 
Estimate Std. Error  Estimate Std. Error 
A. Exponential discounting 
Positive mood 
 
Task order=1 -0.078 0.061  0.039 0.030 
Task order=0 0.004 0.101  
Negative mood 
 
Task order=1 -0.076 0.098  -0.043 0.038 
Task order=0 0.241** 0.100  
Task order 
Positive mood 0.234** 0.084  
-0.035 0.026 Negative mood -0.001 0.082  
Control 0.315** 0.107  
Constant 0.591** 0.113  0.129** 0.039 
  
0.080** 0.016    
   
0.028** 0.009 
B. Hyperbolic discounting 
Positive mood 
 
Task order=1 -0.081 0.064  0.041 0.031 
Task order=0 0.004 0.101  
Negative mood 
 
Task order=1 
-0.080 0.106  -0.043 0.040 
Task order=0 0.244** 0.099  
Task order 
Positive mood 0.237** 0.086  
-0.035 0.027 Negative mood -0.003 0.088  
Control 0.321** 0.105  
Constant 0.581** 0.112  0.133** 0.039 
  
0.082** 0.017    
40 
 
    
 0.029** 0.009 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level. This table presents several conditional marginal effects. For example, 
“Positive mood, Task order=1” refers to the marginal effect of Positive mood conditional on Task order taking the 
value of 1. In other words, “Positive mood, Task order=1” captures the effect of positive mood in the treatments that 
intervened a cognitively demanding task before risk preference elicitation. Likewise, “Task order, Positive mood” 
refers to the effect of order of the tasks for subjects induced into Positive mood.  
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Table VII. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming RDU and expo-power function 
r  a  
Curvature of the 
probability weighting 
function    Individual discount rate  
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Positive 
mood 
 
Task order=1 1.042 0.636 -4.947 11.546 0.227 0.152 0.056 0.058 
Task order=0 0.059 0.215 -0.511 1.086 -0.050 0.181 
Negative 
mood 
 
Task order=1 0.227 0.813 -4.069 10.670 0.023 0.139 -0.048 0.082 
Task order=0 0.330 0.208 0.760 1.564 0.187 0.368 
Task 
order 
Positive mood -0.106 0.157 4.540 2.919 -0.051 0.097 
-0.055 0.050 Negative mood -1.192** 0.498 4.147* 2.305 -0.493 0.358 
Control -1.089 0.680 8.976 10.931 -0.328 0.238 
Constant 0.255 0.178 1.158 2.207 0.668** 0.183 0.151 0.171 
  
0.107** 0.011       
    
    0.032 0.033 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level. This table presents several conditional marginal effects. For example, “Positive mood, Task order=1” refers to 
the marginal effect of Positive mood conditional on Task order taking the value of 1. In other words, “Positive mood, Task order=1” captures the effect of 
positive mood in the treatments that intervened a cognitively demanding task before risk preference elicitation. Likewise, “Task order, Positive mood” refers 
to the effect of order of the tasks for subjects induced into Positive mood.  
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 Table VIII. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming RDU and expo-power function (gender differences) 
r  a  
Curvature of the 
probability weighting 
function    Individual discount rate  
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error   Estimate Std. Error 
Positive 
mood 
Males -0.593 0.687 4.225 3.560 -0.208 0.221 
-0.011 0.028 
Females -0.491** 0.113 8.068** 3.886 -0.176 0.126 
Females only session -0.407** 0.129 3.308 2.733 -0.095 0.137 -0.009 0.036 
Males only session -0.122 0.247 3.630** 1.360 -0.025 0.082 -0.032 0.038 
Gender 
Positive mood -0.822 0.670 -1.313 3.870 -0.266 0.208 
0.014 0.049 
Negative mood -0.720** 0.155 2.530 2.562 -0.234 0.159 
Constant 0.931** 0.059 -1.295 1.668 0.861** 0.160 0.077 0.081 
  
0.084** 0.009       
    
    0.021** 0.016 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level. This table presents several conditional marginal effects. For example, “Positive mood, Task order=1” refers to 
the marginal effect of Positive mood conditional on Task order taking the value of 1. In other words, “Positive mood, Task order=1” captures the effect of 
positive mood in the treatments that intervened a cognitively demanding task before risk preference elicitation. Likewise, “Task order, Positive mood” refers 
to the effect of order of the tasks for subjects induced into Positive mood.  
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Figure I. Kernel density estimates for affect scores 
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